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IN THE SUPREME COURT
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH
I

JAl\IES H. PO\VERS,

Plaintiff

~

Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH & SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION,
Defendants~

10587

Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as below.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission
of the State of Utah for disability by reason of a heart
eondition claimed to have been aggravated while performing the duties of a fireman for Salt Lake City
Corporation.
1
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DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
The matter was heard by the Industrial Commi1.
sion and referred to a Medical Panel. The Medical
Panel filed its report with the Industrial Commission
finding that the incident of September 25, 1963, did 110;
aggravate a pre-existing heart ailment. The Industrial
Commissoin adopted the report and denied plaintiffs
claim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the In·
dustrial Commission.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Com·
mission on July 23, 1964, for a disability incurred while
responding to a fire call at No. 4 Fire Station on
September 25, 1963. ( R. 1). The claim filed by plain·
tiff stated that the incident happened on April 7, 1964.
However, this was amended to September 25, 1963.
( R. 15). Plaintiff alleged that the disability started on
April 7, 1964.
Plaintiff testified that he is 33 years of age; that
he served in the Army from 1954 to 1958; having
received physical examinations yearly and a thorough
physical examination when he was discharged.
2
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He testified that he was employed by the Salt
Lake City Fire Department on August 16, 1959, and
worked continuously from that time until April 7,
!96~. ( R. 33-36) . Prior to September 25, 1963, he
had never experienced severe chest pains or complaints
of that nature. (R. 35). He had always been active
in sports. ( R. 35). He testified that during the time
he worked for the Fire Department he was employed
as a combat fireman; that at the time of the incident
in question, he was on the swing shift which involved
filling in at various fire stations for men off duty or
sick. He would work a 24-hour shift and then be off
2~ hours. He would work three shifts and then have
three days off. The usual shift would start at 9 :00
A.U. The firemen would do their housework, go on
inspection, have a drill period in the afternoon, and
respond to any fire calls which they received. ( R-37 38). Usually when on duty, plaintiff would go to bed
at approximately 10:30 P.M. (R. 38).
On the occasion in question, he had performed a
routine day and had gone to sleep at approximately
10:30 P.M. at Fire Station No. 4. They received a
call at 1 :39 A.M. to 1135 East on First South. Plaintiff testified that when the call came in, there was
anxiety and that when he got out of bed he felt weak.
He quickly dressed and ran to the tailboard on the fire
truck. (R. 38-39). He testified that he immediately
got out of bed and that they had to clear the fire station
in 10 or 20 seconds; that he rushed to the back of the
truck; that he felt nervous and excited. As the truck
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pulled out of the fire station, plaintiff had severe pains
just above his diaphragm, and extending upward int0
his shoulder. He described the pain as a burning sensation. About two blocks farther down I Street, when
the truck was beginning to turn onto South Temple,
plaintiff put his arm through a leather strap and held
onto the bar, at which time he slumped and lost consciousness until the truck reached its destination. One
of his fellow employees informed the captain at that
time that plaintiff was ill. At the scene of the fire he
sat down on the tailboard and described the pain as so
severe that it made him want to retch. He was taken
back to the fire station in the car of Captain Donaldson
and spent the balance of the night at the station. He
did not desire to return home that night in order to
avoid causing worry to his wife. (R. 40-41).
Plaintiff described the alarm procedure and how
the men are awakened; that overhead lights will come
on about a second before a gong starts ringing. This
is described as a loud gong. When he responds to a
fire in this fashion at night he definitely feels excite·
ment and tension.
Plaintiff continued to perform his duties as a fire·
man following the incident of September 25, 1963, until
March 16, 1964, when he went to see Dr. Null. Plain·
tiff testified that following September 25, 1963, he
continued to have the chest pains that he had noticed
in the early morning of September 25, although the
pains were not as severe as they were on that night.

4
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(R. 42). He testified that he had at least one of these
chest pains a day, described as a pulling and burning
sensation, atlhough not as severe as on September 25.
'Vhile under Dr. Null's care, on April 7, 1964,
plaintiff passed out and was taken to the St. Mark's
Hospital. He remained there until April 12, 1964. He
has been completely disabled since April 7, 1964. (R.
44).

Since April 7, 1964, plaintiff has continued to have
the same pains, although more frequently than before,
testifying that on some days he will have three of these
attacks.
Plaintiff testified that when he first went
for the Fire Department, he was given a
examination, and thereafter received yearly
examinations from the Fire Department, the
being in June or July of 1963. ( R. 46-47) .

to work
physical
physical
last one

Plaintiff's wife testified that prior to September
25, 1963, her husband never made any complaints of
chest pain; that he had no unusual complaints except
for hemorrhoids; that he was an active man. She testified that after September 25, 1963, he made complaints
about chest pain, and there were occasions when she
noticed plaintiff hunching over, apparently in pain.
She noticed these complaints almost every day and
increasing in frequency with the passage of time. (R.
68-70).

Dr. Clyde F. Null, a local physician, specializing
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in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiovascular disease, testified that plaintiff came to him for treat.
ment on March 16, 1964, at which time he gave hirn
an examination and made a detailed cardiovascular
evaluation. Dr. Null diagnosed plaintiff as being
afflicted with an atherosclerotic heart disease, com.
monly called hardening of the arteries, with an asso·
ciated severe anginal syndrome, plus an electrocardiographic abnormality designated as Wolf-ParkinsonWhite syndrome. ( R. 18). Following the initial visit,
Dr. Null also established that plaintiff had a high blood
fat level. (R. 19). Dr. Null stated that plaintiff com·
plained of pain which began in the chest, primarily
behind the breastbone, radiating into the neck and
into the left shoulder and ulnar aspect of the left arm,
which pain is fairly characteristic of insufficient blood
supply to the heart muscle itself. Dr. Null testified that
Mr. Powers, after the first examination, continued to
have increasing amounts of distress in the form of pain
and limitation, culminating in the episode of April 7,
1964, when he collapsed. Dr. Null testified that .Mr.
Powers is unable to perform ordinary work; he can·
not climb stairs; and he cannot perform ordinary ac·
tivity without the development of severe pain. (R. 21).
The Wolf-Parkinson-White syndrome is unrelated to
any type of chest pain, this being a congenital con·
dition which affects the rhythm of the heart beat. This
is usually a nondisabling condition and is not related
to the atherosclerotic heart disease. (R. 20-21). Dr.
Null testified that acute changes in the heart from this
6
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particular disease are almost always brought about by
;cute strenuous exercise, acute emotional upsets, and
rarely, by overeating. Chronic stress and chronic anxiety
tend to greatly accentuate the symptoms in this particular disorder and do indeed aggravate the condition
and make it worse. ( R. 24) .
Dr. Null was given a hypothetical questionassuming the facts of the incident of September 25,
1963, the lack of complaints prior thereto, and the
complaints described by plaintiff thereafter, together
with the examination conducted by Dr. Null and the
subsequent course of Mr. Powers' condition. Based on
this hypothetical question, Dr. Null was asked the following question: (R. 26).
"Now I'll ask you whether you have an opinion
as to whether or not the incident that I have
described on September 25, 1963, aggravated
or precipitated the condition which you later
found to exist in regard to Mr. Powers' heart
and arteries?"
The doctor answered as follows:
"A. Well, certainly-as we have indicated
previously-acute stress, strain, emotional aggravation and sudden abrupt exercise, maximum
effort, these could easily have precipitated an
occlusion of a coronary artery, or could easily
have greatly aggravated any underlying or preexisting coronary artery difficulty, or atherosclerosis. The fact that the man developed pain
at that time is very strong evidence that he very
likely did indeed aggravate the underlying heart
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disease, which must have been present prior to
the development of his pain. Because of the way
the disease comes about. I would believe that u;e
situation that you described did indeed aggravate or precipitate the pain factor that we now
have, yes."
Following the hearing of January 18, 1965, in
which the evidence of plaintiff, plaintiff's wife, and
Dr. Null, among others, was taken, the Industrial Commission referred the matter to a Medical Panel, with
Dr. L. E. Viko as the chairman. (R. 74). The Commission directed the Panel in part as follows:
"The Panel has no jurisdiction to make a
finding on the occurrence of an accident. Therefore, in the Panel report just preceding the findings and conclusions, the following language
should be used; assuming but not deciding that
applicant had an accident as alleged the Panel
finds, etc."
The Medical Panel rendered its first report on
March 18, 1965. ( R. 86). The Panel concludes with
the following: (R. 87).
"In view of the fact that the Panel finds no
evidence of a myocardial infarction from the
episode of September, 1963, and even granting
that an attack of angina pectoris may have been
precipitated by the occupational events of that
evening, the Panel finds it hard to accept the
idea that the occupational events of that evening
and the attack of that evening were sufficient
to aggravate pre-existing coronary-artery dis·
ease to the point of progressive and disabling
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heart disease. The subsequent events after September, 1963, may reasonably be explained as
part of the natural course of coronary artery
disease."
In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel states in
part: (R. 87).
"It is recognized, of course, that emotional
or physical strain may precipitate angina pectoris in a man with pre-existing arteriosclerotic
heart disease. The emotional and physical strain
of response to the fire might have been such a
precipitating factor for an anginal attack, but
also other physical and emotional factors in his
life, such as the worry about the illness and possible malignant disease in his wife, could equally
well be such precipitating factors."
It is interesting to note that the Panel obtained
its speculation concerning possible worry on the part
of Mr. Powers concerning illness and possible malignant disease in his wife from his testimony at R. 42,
where he testified concerning pains which he experienced following the incident of September 25, 1963.

"A. Yes, I did. But I noticed that I started
having these pains around my heart more often,
and the pain wasn't near so severe as that night,
and I couldn't understand why it was. I thought
I may have pulled a muscle or something across
my chest, because I played handball and everything all the time. And my wife, at that particular time_~he was having some female trouble,
and the doctor didn't know whether it was nonmalignant or malignant or what not, and I was

9
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worrying about this. She kept after me to go
in to see a doctor and get a physical checkup
but I told her that I just had one in June i
think, or July, on the Fire Department, and J
really didn't think there was too much to worn
about. But I "'.as worried .over her, and having
the both of us m the hospital at the same time,
and not knowing what was going to happen, so
I just put off my examination until she got out
of the hospital with her operation."
·
Plaintiff filed objections to the Panel report, (R

91-93), and a further hearing was held by the Indus-

trial Commission. The Medical Panel, in its report,
admitted that:
"In view of subsequent events, it is reasonable to assume that this eposide of September,
1963, was an angina! attack."
Dr. Viko admitted at R. 110 of the hearing of
August 20, 1965:
"A. If you assume that he had that night an
extreme degree of excitement, and if you assume
that he had no other worry at that time, then
it's entirely reasonable to assume that that situ·
ation precipitated an attack of angina. And
again assuming that he had one, which we haven't
proof of except by a description of the subse·
quent events."
Also, he answered the following question:
"Q. Now in your report did you assume that
Mr. Powers was telling the truth when he stated
that he had no attacks or symptoms before the
night of the fire call on September 25, 1963, and
10
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that he thereafter had frequent attacks, especially
whenever he tried to do any physical exercise,
up until he went to see Dr. Null in March of
1964?
"A. Regarding the first part of the question
-that he had had no trouble before that night
-since the Panel had nothing to contradict that,
we assumed that as a fact. And we did accept
the statement that he continued to have pain
thereafter."
In addition, at this hearing, both Mr. and Mrs.
Powers testified concerning the so-called worry about
the illness and possible malignant disease in his wife.
Mrs. Powers testified that her doctor had diagnosed
her condition as a small tumor in her uterus and that
"you don't have to worry about it being malignant."
That she planned at some time in the future to have
an opera ti on to have it removed. ( R. 116) .

Mr. Powers testified as follows at R. 121:
"Q. My question is were you worried about
that at the time of this incident at all?

"A. I was aware of it, but I can't say that I
worried about it. Because at that particular time
I was worrying about nothing but going to the
fire.
"Q. Did you even have your wife in mind at
the time you were running to the fire?

"A. No, I certainly didn't."
The Panel submitted another report under date

of October 5, 1965. (R. 125). The Panel stated in part
as

follows:
11
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"Under date of March 18, 1965, this Panel
submitted to you its opinion regarding the aborenamed case. This opinion was to the effect that
in view of the fact that ]\fr. Powers was not
examined between the episode of September.
1963, and March, 1964, the Panel had no certai 11
means of knowing his heart condition after this
alleged accident. By description, however, an<l
subsequent events, it appears that Mr. Powers
had that night at least an angina! attack. The
Panel cannot exclude the possibility that he ha<l
a myocardial infarction, but the fact that he <li<l '
not consult a doctor for six months makes this
seem highly improbable to the Panel * * * The
Panel found it hard to accept the idea that the
occupational events of that evening and the
attack of that evening was sufficient to aggravate pre-existing coronary heart disease to the
point of progressing and disabling heart disease. The Panel felt that it was more probable
in view of subsequent events that the progression
was a natural part of the course of coronary
artery disease. The Panel felt that the records
seemed to show that the events of that evening
entailed no more emotional tension than that
in many other fires that had been the usual part
of his occupational duties in the past four years."
The Panel adopted the original conclusion, and
plaintiff thereafter filed objections to the second Panel
report. ( R. 129-130). In lieu of holding another hearing, plaintiff submitted the matter to the Commission
with a written argument. (R. 132-134). The Commission rendered its order on February 16, 1966, in which
it denied the claim of plaintiff. Part of the final paragraph of the order states as follows: ( R. 138) .

12
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"The heart ailment was not reported for six
months after the alleged incident. There was no
unusual exertion or unusual emotional stress
on the date the alleged accident occurred. In
our opinion, the incident of April 7, 1964, did
not aggravate a pre-existing heart ailment; if
any there w;is, and it surely would not result
in damage to a normal heart.
"It is therefore ordered that the claim be denied."

Plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing ( R. 139) ,
which was denied by the Industrial Commission on
March 3, 1966. (R. 140). Plaintiff thereafter filed his
petition for Writ of Certiorari to appeal the order of
the Industrial Commission denying his claim.

POINT I
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
WAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE.
The Industrial Commission states in the final paragraph of its order:
"The heart ailment was not reported for six
months after the alleged incident. There was no
unusual exertion or unusual emotional stress
on the date the alleged accident occurred. In our
opinion, the incident of April 7, 1964, did not
aggravate a pre-existing heart ailment; if any
there was, and it surely would not result in damage to a normal heart."

13
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The foregoing language is as much opposed to tli.
undisputed evidence in the record as the statement that
the incident occurred on April 7, 1964. The record
shows that the incident happened on September 25.
1963, awl plaintiff specifically amended his claim \,,
so show. ( R. 15). Not only is the foregoing staterne 11 t
contrary to the evidence, but it is also contrary to tbt
law, when it relies on the statement that the incident
would not result in damage to a normal heart. It j1
obvious and unnecessary to cite authorities to the effec\
that industrial accident claimants need not prove thai
the accident in question would have injured 11orrn:1I
parts of the body. The only thing that the claimant
need show was that he was in fact injured on the job
and was caused a disability. The foregoing statement
of the Industrial Commission flies directly in the face
of the specific language of Section 35-1-60, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, speaking of a disability

" * * * on account of any accident or injury
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, ag·
gravated or incurred by such employee in the
course of or because of or arising out of his employment," (Italics ours).
The fore going language by the Industrial Com·
mission is typical of the manner in which both the
Medical Panel and the Industrial Commission have disregarded and ignored the undisputed facts of this case.
In addition,the quoted portion of the order by the Industrial Commission is also fallacious in relying on
the so-called unusual exertion test which has been

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

abolished in the State of Utah. The case of Purity
Biscuit Company, et al., v. Industrial Commission, et
al., (1949), 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961, did away with
1
the unusual strain test in Industrial Commission cases
in Utah. Since this case, the law in Utah has been
concerned with the simple proposition as to whether
or not the exertion, whether it be unusual exertion, or
ordinary exertion caused the injury in question. Howem, the Utah Industrial Commission has completely
ignored this case and the cases fallowing it, when it
states in its order that it is relying on the fact that
there was no unusual exertion or unusual emotional
stress on the date of the alleged accident. The Medical
- Panel fell into the same error which the Industrial Commission adopted when it stated in its letter of October
5, 1965, at R. 125:

I

\
I
t

li

I
1

"The Panel felt that the records seemed to
show that the events of that evening entailed no
more emotional tension than that in many other
fires that had been the usual part of his occupational duties in the past four years."
The evidence is undisputed that at the time of
the incident in question, James Powers, being subjected to a fire call in the early hours of the morning
was subjected to exertion and emotional stress, and
that he suffered a severe pain in his chest and shoulders.
It is undisputed that Powers had not experienced such
pain prior to September 25, 1963. It is undisputed
that thereafter, Powers periodically experienced reCltrrences of these chest pains although not as severe,

15
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until the time he sought the medical help of Dr. Xi.
The Chairman of the l\ledical Panel, Dr. Viko,
H. 100, even agreed as follows:

"If you assume that he had that night ant
treme degree of excitement, and if you assl!J]) ,
that he had no other worry at that time, thr'n'
it's entirely reasonable to assume that that situ[ 1l
ation precipitated an attack of angina. Am])1
again assuming that he had one, whi£h we haveniln
proof of except by a description of the subsf I
quent events."

0

Dr. Viko agreed when questioned as to the histon I
relied on that the Panel assumed that Powers was tell I
ing the truth when he stated that he had no attad· '
or symptoms before the night of the fire call on Sep
tember 25, 1963, and that he thereafter had frequell·I
attacks. In answer to this question at R. I l l Dr. Yik11I
I
stated:
"Regarding the first part of the questionthat he had had no trouble before that nightsince the Panel had nothing to contradict that.
we assumed that as a fact. And we did accept
the statement that he continued to have paill
thereafter."

It is obvious that if the Panel accepted these un·
disputed facts as testified to by Mr. Powers and his
wife, that the following statement by the Panel in it 1
report of October 5, 1965, R. 125, is unsupported by'
evidence:

16
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?\11

o,

"The Panel felt that it was more probable in
view of subsequent events that the progression
was a natural part of the course of coronary
artery disease."

If the panel felt that the progression of the coroSW1J1nary artery disease was a natural progression, then
:i;:'/ it had to disregard the undisputed evidence of the
Anijsevere attack which Mr. Powers experienced on the
renil night of September 25, 1963, the fact that he had
tbst had no prior attacks, and the fact that he had subsequent attacks with increasing frequency. It is sub:on mitted that in view of the confusion and the unsup:eJJ. ported speculations of the Medical Panel in this case
.ck· that the clear and convincing evidence of Dr. Null
ep stands unchallenged and unaffected.

!le.!

il

In its original report of March 19, 1965, the
iku Uedical Panel even went so far as to speculate that
: ll'orry about the illness and possible malignant disease
_: mhis wife could equally well have been a precipitating
- factor along with the emotional and physical strain of
it the fire call in question. The Panel based this specupt lation on some evidence by Mr. Powers that after the
Ill incident in question one reason why he did not seek
medical aid was that his wife was seeing a doctor about
l· rnme female trouble, and that he was worried about
ner. However, in the subsequent hearing, Mr. Powers
s testified that he was not worried at the time of the
1 1 incident in question about his wife's condition; and his
wife testified that the doctor had told her that there was
r ~tile to worry about concerning the possible malig-

:

11

1

l
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nancy of the tumor. This illustrates the ends to whicli
the Medical Panel has gone to defeat Mr. Power~
claim.
Dr. Null in his testimony showed no hesitancy 01
uncertainty concerning the obvious conclusion of the
effect of the fire call on Mr. Powers' underlying con·
dition, when he stated at page R. 26:
"'Vell, certainly-as we have indicated pre· I
viously, ac11te stress, strain, emotional aggrava·
tion and sudden abrupt exercise, maximum ef·
fort, these could easily have precipitated an
occlusion of a coronary artery, or could easily
have greatly aggravated any underlying or pre·
existing coronary artery difficulty or athero·
sclerosis. The fact that the man developed pain
at that time is very strong evidence that he very
likely did indeed aggravate the underlying heart
disease, which must have been present prior to
the develop~ent of his pain. Because of the wa)'
the disease comes about. I would believe that
the situation you described did indeed aggravate
or precipitate the pain factor that we now have,
yes."
Another factor which seemed to affect the con·
clusion of the Medical Panel was the fact that Powers
did not seek medical aid for some six months after the
incident; however, there is not one iota of evidence dis·
puting the fact that Powers had complaints dating
from the incident and increasing in frequency until he
sought medical assistance. As a matter of fact, Dr.
Viko specifically agrees that the Medical Panel accepted
this as fact. How can the Medical Panel accept this
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fact on one hand and then at the same time state that
because he did not seek medical assistance for some
. six months after the incident, they do not believe that
i the heart condition was aggravated by the incident in
question? The fallacy of the conclusion of the Medical
Panel is obvious.
• The Medical Panel and the Industrial Commission
'. not only have disregarded the undisputed evidence,
but they have completely ignored the fundamental
philosophy and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Statutes in Utah. The recent case of Baker v. The
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., (1965) 17 Utah
Zd 141, 405 P.2d 613, has reaffirmed the liberal philosophy of the VVorkmen's Compensation Statutes, where
the court stated:
"In accordance with the purpose of the Industrial Compensation Act to alleviate hardships upon workers and their families, the facts
and inferences therefrom constituting a worker's
right to recover are liberally construed."

The case at bar clearly demonstrates the injustice
of giving lip service to such pronouncements by the
Supreme Court and then ignoring them. The claimant
in the Baker case was a clerk-typist who felt a sudden
sharp pain in her left hip and leg as she stooped over
or raised up. She did not report this incident until the
Tuesday after the Friday of the incident. The court
Ill the Baker case held that the Commission could not
ignore undisputed evidence and reversed the denial of
' compensation. Certainly had the Medical Panel in the
1
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~ase

staJ,

at bar reviewed the Baker cas:, it would have
m loud language that the stoopmg over and raisi11 ,,
'1
up was not an unusual exertion but something th:i
Aleen Baker did every working day of her life. Tit:
Industrial Commission has ignored the clear recent prr1 1
nouncement of the Baker case.
1

The case of Jones, et al., v. California Packi1u
Corporation, (1952) 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, il;
a case similar in principle to the case at bar. It invoheJII
death from coronary occlusion occurring after exertiou
on the job by the husband of claimant. After stating
the well-settled principle which has been ignored by the
Industrial Commission in the case at bar that:
1

\

"It is settled beyond question that a pre-exist·
ing disease or other disturbed condition or defect
of the body when aggravated or lighted up by an
industrial accident is compensable under the
Act, * * * "

the court proceeds in that case to examine the medical
evidence in the record. The plaintiffs called two doctors
who each testified positively that it was their opinion
that this occlusion and death resulted from the exertion
and fatigue caused by the work under the circumstances:
described just prior to J ones's death. The opposing
evidence was given by a doctor who was given the hypo· i
thetical question and answered as follows:
11

"I can't answer the question yes or no because
I don't think the medical literature from mv own
opinion or anybody else's opinion can saJ; dog·
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matically this is a definite cause, because the
medical literature is full of statements that there
is some relationship between effort and coronary
thrombosis; and the literature is full of statements to the effect that apparently effort has
no relationship to coronary thrombosis. * * *
My own opi,nion is that it possibly is related
in this particular case, but I don't think you can
dogmatically say that it is a cause and effect
or it has no effect."
The evidence was positive on one side and inconclusive on the other, with the result that the Industrial
Commission was bound, so the Supreme Court held,
to accept the evidence of the plaintiffs.
Likewise, in the case at bar, the evidence produced
on behalf of the plaintiff is clear, direct, and positive.
The evidence adduced by the Medical Panel, which
was accepted by the Industrial Commission, is inconclusive, speculative, and in derogation of the very facts
which Dr. Viko stated that the Panel accepted as being
true. Certainly a conclusion that is not based on evidence and logic is just as inconclusive as the opposing
testimony in the Jones case, and therefore we cite the
Jones case as direct and compelling authority in favor
i of reversing the Industrial Commission in the case at
'. bar. Not only is the report of the Medical Panel not
in accordance with the evidence and illogical, but it
is also filled with misconceptions of the law in Utah,
: such as the necessity to show an unusual strain and
the fact that aggravations of prior existing injuries
i are not compensable. The Industrial Commission per1

1

1
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petuated these errors and adopted these misconceptio111
of the law. Such an order, in justice, cannot stand.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the order of the Jn.
dustrial Commission denying plaintiff's claim should be
reversed and plaintiff's claim granted.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
Rawlings, 'Vallace, Roberts & Black
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

